當主權不再意味著安全
Dec 3rd 2009
From The Economist print edition
Dubai is small fry. But scares about government default will be the world economy's next big problem
迪拜危機無足輕重，但政府違約所引發的恐懼將是世界經濟所面臨的下一個問題
http://www.ecocn.org/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=28683&extra=page%3D1
A WEEK after Dubai World announced its debt standstill, the financial panic seems to have disappeared as quickly as a desert squall. Stockmarkets rebounded as investors concluded that Dubai is too small for its woes to pose a systemic threat (see article). It is tempting to see the affair as a hiccup—damaging for the Gulf's credibility but lacking broader significance. That would be a mistake. Tiny though it is, Dubai symbolises wider uncertainties. Most obviously it shows that the fallout from the credit binge continues: estimates of credit losses are still rising, notably in commercial property. But the more important repercussion has to do with sovereign risk.
迪拜世界宣佈暫停還債一週後，金融恐慌似乎已經如沙漠風暴般轉瞬即逝。投資者認定迪拜遭受的磨難太過渺小，不足以引發系統威脅；因此股票市場開始反彈。海灣地區的信譽深受傷害，但影響範圍有限；迪拜事件的這種特點容易讓人聯想到打嗝。但事實並非如此。（從細微的角度分析，）迪拜雖小，卻代表著不斷擴大的不 確定性。最明顯的地方在於它揭示了信貸持續氾濫的後果：信貸損失的預估還在上升，這點在商業資產上體現得非常明顯；更重要的後果則與主權風險有關。
Dubai World's debt was not technically government-backed, but it was widely regarded as such by investors, who drew scant distinction between the Dubai government and a company it wholly owned. Dubai's repudiation of that implicit guarantee marks an important milestone. It has prompted a reappraisal of the riskiness of other Gulf debt; increased concerns about other overextended emerging economies (such as Hungary and Latvia); and a renewed bout of anxiety over the prospect of default in the peripheral economies of the euro zone, especially Greece, where there has long been an assumption that the European Union (read Germany) would, if necessary, come to the rescue (see article).
從技術層面上分析，迪拜世界的債務並非政府擔保，但很多投資者將迪拜政府和政府獨資的公司混為一談，因此對迪拜世界的政府背景堅信不疑。（絕對的品質保證就是迪拜聲譽的重要基石）。迪拜準確標示無法履行債務是一個標誌性事件，催生了對海灣債務風險狀況的重新評估；導致人們更加關注過度發展的新興經濟體，比如匈牙利和拉脫維亞；歐元區周邊經濟體存在違約的可能性，並導致了憂慮的再次爆發，希臘的問題尤為嚴重，該國長久以來一直幻想著歐盟（意指德國）會在必要的時候伸出救援之手。
Dubai is an emerging economy, but, looking forward, the developed world, where official government debt has soared, looks riskier than the faster-growing big emerging economies, whose public debt burden may well fall. In 2007 average government debt in the G20』s big rich economies, at just under 80% of GDP, was double that of big emerging economies. By 2014 the ratio, at 120% of GDP, could be more than three times higher. That alone will challenge old rules of thumb about the relative riskiness of emerging-market debt. But it will not be the only change. The scale of contingent liabilities, such as government guarantees on bank debt, differs hugely between countries, with a far bigger increase in the rich economies at the heart of the crisis. And don't forget local public finances. Plenty of American states are in a pretty dire situation.
迪拜也是一個新興經濟體，由於發展速度較高，新興經濟體大國的公債負擔將會下降；但是放眼發達國家，政府債券飆升；兩廂比較而言，發達國家的風險應該更高 一些。2007年20國集團中富裕國家的國債接近GDP的80%，幾乎相當於新興經濟大國的兩倍。這個比例在2014年將達到GDP的120%，也就是超 過新興經濟大國三倍有餘。僅此就挑戰了經驗法則對新興市場債務風險的估算。（關於新興市場債務風險的估算僅憑這個就會受到質疑。）發生變化的不光這一項，或有負債比例原本就在不同國家間存在很大差異，比如政府擔保銀行債券；在危機最為嚴重的時候富裕國家的這個比例將會大大的增加。同時還不能忽視本地公共財政，不少美國州府正處於非常恐怖的情況中。
The reassessment of sovereign risk will hover over the world economy for years, but its impact is already being felt. Capital is flooding to the bonds of big emerging economies, squeezing yields and pushing up their currencies. In the rich world the jitters of potential investors are framing today's fiscal debate, even as output remains depressed and bond yields low. Thanks to the bigger, friendlier new IMF, emerging economies can count on more outside support than they used to. In contrast, some rich countries have fewer options. Euro membership, for instance, has removed the option of quasi-default via inflation for the heavily indebted on Europe's periphery. And some countries are more determined to deal with this than others: Ireland has raised taxes and cut spending, but Greece has shown scant appetite for austerity.
對於主權風險的重新評估將在未來數年中威脅到世界經濟，不過衝擊已經顯現出來了。資本潮水般的流向新興經濟大國，購買該地區國債、擠壓收益並迫使貨幣升 值。富裕國家中潛在投資者的緊張不安促成了當今產出蕭條和債券收益率低迷的財政討論。更大更友善的國際貨幣基金組織給與新興經濟體提供了比以往更多的外部 幫助。富裕國家反而缺乏更多選擇，以歐盟成員國為例，歐洲周邊地區的沉重債務造成了通脹，進而讓他們失去了准違約的可能。一些國家在應對違約方面決心更 大：愛爾蘭在提高稅收的同時削減了支出，但希臘對緊縮經濟僅表現出有限的興趣。
Seeing through the sandstorm
穿越迷霧
If sovereign risk is back as a worry, what should indebted governments do? Two things stand out: fiscal transparency and a clear path to medium-term government prudence. The latter does not mean abandoning fiscal stimulus prematurely, but laying out a credible plan for how debt will be brought under control once the recovery strengthens. Greater clarity on the limits of government liabilities and burden-sharing would also help. The euro area, for instance, would be far better off with a clear set of rules governing sovereign crises within its borders. The alternative is clumsy, unpredictable, one-off decisions—in other words, more episodes like Dubai.
如果主權風險重又成為一種憂慮，那些債台高築的政府該如何應對？有兩件事情凸現出來：財政透明度以及政府對中期債券順暢的採取審慎態度。後者並不是意味著 過早的放棄財政刺激，而是在經濟復甦得以加強後如何制定可信的計划來控制債務。更加清晰的政府責任限額及義務分擔政策同樣有幫助作用。以歐元區為例，如果 有一套清晰的規則來管理內部的政權風險，那麼結果會好很多。若非如此，就只有複雜、難以預測和一次性的決定可以選擇；換而言之，迪拜慘劇將出現續集。
Johnny:這是大陸人翻譯的文章，我只是把他轉貼過來
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